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Abstract  
This paper analyses the issue of the dynamics of the TARGET2 system balances during the sovereign debt crisis. The 
development of these balances reflects the change in the distribution of the monetary base among the EMU Member States. 
During the sovereign debt crisis, while some countries, among which Germany, registered a decisive inflow of monetary base, 
some others, as Italy, shown an outflow. The main conclusion of the paper is that the dynamics in TARGET2 is rather due 
to a fall in the level of confidence in the capacity of the EMU to survive than to disparities in the level of competitiveness 
among countries of the Eurozone as a part of the literature maintained. In turn, this crisis of confidence has to be considered 
as the consequence of the implicit refusal of the European institutions of creating a mechanism working as “lender of last 
resort” for the Eurozone Member States. Two elements, in particular, support this thesis. On the one hand, most of the 
monetary base outflow occurred in coincidence with those political decisions which determined deterioration in the expectation 
about the degree of solvency of the periphery countries. On the other hand, the fiscal consolidation that the periphery countries 
implemented destabilized the economy as a result of a negative conjuncture and a monetary policy ineffective in reducing the 
interest rate.  
 
JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58, E62, F32, F34, F36.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to present further elements of analysis about the evolution of TARGET2 
balances during the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis. Our investigation leads to stress that the 
TARGET21 dynamics can be considered rather a direct consequence of specific political choices made by 
European institutions than linked to competitiveness disparities across EMU Member States. More 
specifically, it appears to be related to a certain reluctance of European institutions in setting up a "lender 
of last resort" mechanism in order to provide those needing Member States with financial support.   
 
TARGET2 system is the infrastructure that allows settling the payments related to financial institution 
transactions and to the monetary policy operations within the European Monetary Union (EMU). This 
system, essentially, allows for the monetary base to circulate among national central banks of the Euro 
zone, and registers the inflow and outflow of monetary base for each of these countries.2  
The dynamics of TARGET2 balances was marked, firstly, starting from August 2007, by the global 
financial crisis, but mostly, starting from October 2009, by the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
TARGET2 balances values were negligible until August 2007, when some Member States started 
observing substantial monetary base inflow while some others experienced decisive outflow. In order to 
simplify the explanation we label the first group, in which Germany plays a main role because of the large 
value of its TARGET2 claims, as the "core" countries; while we identify the second group, including Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece among others, as the "periphery" countries.3 
                                                             
1 TARGET stands for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system. 
2 See ECB (2012a). 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the issues raised by the dynamics in the TARGET2 balances, see Cour-Thimann 
(2013). 
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As for the determinants of the evolution in TARGET2 balances, two positions emerged in the 
literature. The first one, we refer to as the "core interpretation" (see  Sinn  and Wollmershäuser 2012a, 
2012b, 2011), argued that TARGET2 imbalances reflected disparities in competitiveness levels among 
EMU Member States. More specifically, periphery countries accumulated over time a considerable deficits 
in their BoP current accounts which were financed with core countries loans. Successively, the crisis 
worsened the micro and macro conditions in periphery countries and negatively affected their access to 
financial markets, so that a reversal of financial flows and a monetary base outflow towards the core 
countries occurred. Financial institutions of the periphery countries were able to bear this outflow mainly 
because the ECB provided an extensive financial support through the non-standard monetary policy 
measures.4 
However, those interventions had the only outcome of keep feeding the current account deficit and 
delaying the necessary price adjustment process. Had the ECB non intervened, a real depreciation process 
would have taken place. On the one hand, a higher interest rate would have stimulated an inflow of 
financial resources from the core countries and, on the other hand, a lower wage rate would have fostered 
the competitiveness of the production system in the international markets of goods and services.  
 
The second one, we refer to as the "periphery interpretation", appears to emerge as the common 
denominator of a series of contributions reviewing and commenting on the "core interpretation".  
According to this second view, TARGET2 imbalances reflected financial market tensions rather due to a 
lack of confidence toward the ability of the European institutions and of the EMU to face the sovereign 
debt crisis than to an imbalance in the level of competitiveness among the EMU Member States (see 
Panico and Purificato, 2013). Basically, financial market operators incorporated in the yield of sovereign 
securities the risk and the expectation of a collapse of the EMU and a return to the respective national 
currencies and, therefore, of their devaluation (see the editorial of the August 2012 Monthly Bulletin; 
ECB, 2012b, pp. 5-7).5 
The crisis revealed, firstly, in the sovereign bond market, where investors get rid of their periphery 
bonds  and, secondly, in the interbank market, where credit institutions were excluded from accessing the 
loans granted by other financial institutions due the potential losses these latter would have experienced 
for being exposed to the sovereign bonds of periphery countries (see De Grauwe and  Ji, 2012). In this 
context, the non-standard monetary policy measures arranged by the ECB, counterbalanced the monetary 
base outflow recorded in the TARGET2 balances avoiding a liquidity crisis for the bank sector in the 
periphery countries.6  
 
The empirical analysis was not successful in identifying the determinants of TARGET2 imbalances. It 
focused in finding a statistical correlation between the TARGET2 imbalances and either the current 
account balance, considered as an indicator of the competitiveness difference among Member States, or 
the financial account balance, considered as an indicator of the financial markets strains. Cecioni and 
Ferrero (2012) stressed a strong correlation between TARGET2 imbalances and those registered in the 
BoP financial account, whereas the imbalances observed in the BoP current account turned to be not 
significant.7 Auer (2013) reached a different conclusion. For De Grauwe and Ji (2012) the TARGET2 
imbalances were correlated with the increasing rate of return of government bond, variable that was 
                                                             
4 Notice here that there were also financial support programs promoted by the Council of the European Union in 
favour of the governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which were beneficiaries of economic and financial 
adjustment programmes, and Spain, which agreed for a banking recapitalization and restructuring programme. 
Nevertheless, we focus on the support provided by the ECB to credit institutions because it was surely more 
relevant according to its economic size. 
5 The fact that the dissolution of EMU has been perceived as likely is witnessed by the speech of Mario Draghi, 
President of the European Central Bank, at the Global Investment Conference held in London on the 26th of July 
2012(http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html). 
6 See Bindseil and König (2011), Cecchetti et al. (2012), Cecioni and Ferrero (2012), De Grauwe and  Ji (2012), 
Garber (2010), Whelan (2012); but also the contribution of ECB (2013, pp. 103-114; 2012c, pp. 8-10; 2011a, pp. 35-
40) and of the Deutsche Bundesbank (2011, pp.34-35). 
7 See also Bindseil and König (2011), Whelan (2012). 
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adopted as indicator of the financial market strain. However, as Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012a) 
suggested, the correlation between the TARGET2 balances and either the financial account balances or 
the rates of return of government bonds does not necessarily imply rejecting the "core interpretation". 
Indeed the financial market strain could easily be traced back to a re-evaluation of country risk related 
rather to the emergence of major imbalances in the levels of competitiveness than to a crisis of 
confidence in the European institutions.8 
 
This paper, in supporting the "periphery interpretation", aims to provide some further elements, not 
yet investigated by the literature, that contribute to shed light on the TARGET2 balances dynamics. First, 
not all the periphery countries characterized by an outflow of monetary base accumulated a relevant 
deficit in the BoP current account. In particular, Italy and Ireland recorded a cumulative surplus in the net 
exports of goods and services, the main indicator of competitiveness for a country. 
Second, a relevant portion of the monetary base outflow from the periphery countries was observed in 
coincidence with specific policy decisions taken by the European institutions, and not when disparities in 
the levels of competitiveness of individual countries emerged. These decisions resulted in the constant 
and implicit refusal to establish a mechanism which would have acted as "lender of last resort" in favour 
of the governments of the periphery countries. This process resulted into a severe deterioration in the 
expectations about the solvency of the Euro area Member States and about the risk linked to their 
possible partial or total default; in other words this process induced severe strains in the financial markets 
due to the fall in the confidence toward the ability of EMU to survive. 
Third, in deciding and implementing its monetary policy, the ECB held its legitimate and unavoidable 
role of “lender of last resort” in order to avoid a liquidity crisis for the credit institutions. The lack of a 
European institution that took on the same responsibility toward the Member States resulted in the 
escalation of the debt crisis. As argued in the literature9, the fiscal consolidation and the real depreciation 
tend to destabilize the economic system when it is in a negative conjuncture and it is coupled with a 
monetary policy ineffective in reducing the rate of interest. This theoretical framework is exactly the one 
experienced by the periphery countries. The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone showed signs of 
reversion only when the ECB satisfied the inevitable need to implicitly assume, so far credibly and under 
specific conditions, the role of “lender of last resort” for the EMU Member States. This was readily 
reflected by a re-absorption in the unbalances observed in the TARGET2 system. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow: Section 2 describes the working mechanism of the 
TARGET2 system and illustrates the economical meaning of its balances. Section 3 offers a reading of 
the literature, classified according to the different proposed interpretation of the TARGET2 dynamics. 
With this respect, two main streams are identified which we refer to as interpretation of the "core" and of 
the "periphery". Section 4 reads the evolution of the TARGET claims for the periphery countries in the 
light of some key political decision adopted by European institutions. Section 5 stresses the legitimacy of 
the ECB's monetary policy choices as pertaining to its role of lender of last resort towards the credit 
institutions; moreover, it points out how the economic context in the periphery countries witnessed the 
needing that this role was covered by other European institution in favour also of their governments. 
Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. The TARGET2 system  
 
The TARGET2 system10 is a settlement infrastructure that allows the smooth regulation of those 
payments linked to the financial institutions transactions and to the monetary policy operations 
implemented by the Eurosystem. This infrastructure connects all the Eurosystem members, with the ECB 
that acts as a clearing house towards the national central banks for the countries that adopted the euro as 
                                                             
8 See also Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). 
9 See Blanchard and Leigh (2013), Arestis (2012), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Eggertsson and Krugman 
(2012) and Christiano et al. (2011). 
10 That replaced TARGET system in 2007. 
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currency. Payments are regulated trough claims and liabilities recorded in the national central banks and 
imputable to the national financial institutions. The payment between banks that belongs to different 
countries is necessarily associated with a monetary base transfer across countries. For this reason the net 
position of each national central bank towards the ECB, the TARGET2 balance, gives an indication on 
the geographical redistribution of the monetary base against the original distribution set up by the 
monetary policy operations. 
 
Table 1 – TARGET2 system and accounting balances 
Financial institution – country A National central bank – country A 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
 
-∆ debits 
financial institution B 
+∆ loans 
financial institution A 
-∆ deposits 
financial institution A 
-∆ deposits 
National central bank A 
+∆ loans 
National central bank A 
 
+∆ liabilities TARGET2 
ECB 
European Central Bank 
Assets Liabilities 
+∆ claims TARGET2 
National central bank  A 
+∆ liabilities  TARGET2 
National central bank B 
National central bank – country B Financial institution – country B 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
-∆ loans 
financial institution B 
+∆ deposits 
financial institution B 
-∆ credits 
financial institution A 
 
+∆ claim TARGET2 ECB  
+∆ deposits 
National central bank B 
-∆ loans 
National central bank B 
 
The following example clarifies what previously stated.11 Considering the transactions between 
financial institutions located in different countries, let's suppose that a financial institution in country A 
extinguish a debt toward a financial institution in country B. Within the TARGET2 system, the 
accounting procedure that records the monetary base transfer between the two countries implies the 
following modifications in the balance sheets of the involved actors (see Table 1). For the financial 
institution in country A, repaying a debt involves a contraction in the liabilities offset either by an increase 
in these latter, when the financial institutions asks for a loan to its national central bank, or by a decrease 
in the assets associated with the reduction in the deposits the financial institution holds at its national 
central bank.  In the balance sheet of the national central bank, then, the increase of the assets due to the 
increase in the loans, or the contraction of the liabilities due to the decrease of deposits, is complemented 
by a TARGET2 liability towards the ECB. This accounting entry identifies the monetary base transfer 
from the national central bank to the ECB.  
The ECB plays the role of clearing house between the national central banks. Because of this, in the 
ECB balance sheet the TARGET2 claim toward the national central bank of country A is offset by the 
TARGET2 liabilities toward the central bank of country B. This registration identifies the definitive 
transfer of the monetary base form the national central bank of country A to the national central bank of 
                                                             
11 For other similar explanations see Cecioni and Ferrero (2012), ECB (2013), Garber (2010), Cour-Thimann (2013).  
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country B. In the balance sheet of the national central bank in Country B, according to the choices of the 
financial institution of this country, the TARGET2 claim is coupled with a reduction in assets due to the 
lower use of loans or an increase in liabilities due to higher level of deposits. Finally, in the balance sheet 
of the financial institution in country B, the decrease in assets associated with the collection of credits due 
from the institution of country A is balanced by a reduction of liabilities associated with fewer loans or by 
an increase in claims associated with more deposits. 
 
In this process two aspects needs to be emphasized. The first one concerns the monetary base. In 
country A, transferring the monetary base to country B implies either the contraction of the previous 
amount of monetary base, if the amount of deposits hold by financial institutions to the national central 
banks decrease, or the stability of monetary base if, on the contrary, the loans increase. In country B, the 
money transfer from country A implies the increase of the existing monetary base, when the amount of 
deposits hold by the financial institutions at the national central bank increase, or maintaining the existing 
level of the monetary base, when loans diminish.  
 The second aspect concerns TARGET2 claims and liabilities, these entries traces how the 
monetary base moves across Eurozone states. When the TARGET2 balance against the ECB, defined as 
the difference between claim and liabilities as accounted in the balance sheet of a national central bank, is 
zero this means that monetary base inflow and outflow balance out perfectly, whereas being the balance 
positive or negative this would indicate, respectively, an inflow or an outflow of monetary base. In brief, 
TARGET2 balances define how the geographical distribution of the monetary base changed with respect 
to the original one as it was determined by the monetary policy operations implemented by the 
Eurosystem. 
 
 
3. The determinants of the dynamic in TARGET2 balances 
 
The dynamics of TARGET2 balances was marked, firstly, by the global financial crisis in August 2007 
and then, starting in October 2009, even more by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. Until August 
2007, the TARGET2 balances were close to zero or, at least, of negligible values. Successively, while 
some national central banks recorded positive balances, some others recorded negative balances with the 
gap increasing together with the worsening of the debt crisis (see Figure 1). In the remainder of the paper, 
the states that showed cumulated claims in TARGET2 balances at the end of 2012 will be identified as 
"core countries", among which a prominent position is occupied by Germany for the absolute size of the 
balance. Symmetrically, the states that have shown TARGET2 liabilities will be identified with the name 
of "periphery countries", among them, in addition to Italy that is included because of the absolute value 
of its balance, we can find Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain as they have been under financial support 
programmes promoted by the European institutions (see Figure 2). 
 
The determinants of the dynamics in TARGET2 balances were extensively explored by the literature 
and two main positions emerged. The first, to which we refer as the "core interpretation" argued that the 
TARGET2 imbalances reflected the disparities in the level of competitiveness across the EMU Member 
States. More specifically, while in the core countries a sustainable fiscal policy was coupled with structural 
reforms aimed at increasing the degree of competitiveness both in the labour and in the good markets, 
the periphery countries limited their action to support domestic demand. Indeed, they sustained its 
private component through a reckless credit policy and its public component through an unsustainable 
fiscal policy. The result has been a growing gap in levels of competitiveness between the two groups of 
countries with those of the core accumulating surpluses and those of the periphery accumulating deficits 
in the current account of balance of payments. 
Until 2007, capital flows from the core countries financed the BoP deficits in the periphery countries. 
With the incoming of the crisis, an increase in the country risk due to a re-evaluation of the micro and 
macro-economic context in the periphery countries, negatively affected the access to financial markets 
both for their government and the financial institutions, causing a capital flow reversal toward the core 
countries. The non-standard measures of monetary policy implemented by the ECB delayed the essential 
prices adjustment, in particular that of the wage rate and the one of the interest rate, and continued to 
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feed the deficit of the public sector budget and that in the BoP current account. Ultimately, TARGET2 
imbalances reflected the outflow from the periphery countries of those financial resources provided for 
the bank sector trough the non-standard monetary policy measures. 
 
Figure 1 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem,  
selected EMU Member States (Jan 1999 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
 
Figure 2 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem,  
EMU Member States (Dec 2010, 2011, 2012) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
Note: (1) for Estonia the December 2010 data is not available.  
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As far as the economic policy recommendations are concerned, the "core interpretation" suggests two 
main routes: austerity policies and structural reforms. The first one consists in a restrictive fiscal and 
monetary policy: the resulting economic slowdown would have promoted an increase in the level of 
competitiveness of peripheral countries by determining a wage rate contraction; moreover, the rise in the 
interest rate connected with the restrictive monetary policy would also have supported the access to 
financial markets by encouraging the inflow of financial capital from abroad. The second one consists in 
setting industrial policies aimed at increasing the degree of competitiveness in the market of goods and 
regulating employment relationships aimed at enhancing the degree of flexibility in the labour market; 
therefore, also in the long run, the level of competitiveness of peripheral countries would have been 
strengthened through the adoption of the structural reforms.12 
 
The second position, which we called  "periphery interpretation" argued that TARGET2 imbalances 
reflected the high strains in the financial market, mainly attributable to a crisis of confidence in the ability 
of the European institutions and, in particular, of the EMU to face the sovereign debt crisis.  What has 
been observed was a sort of overshooting in the rate of return in the government bonds of the periphery 
countries. Irrespective of the macro and micro economic fundamentals and regardless of the existence of 
the alleged divergence in the level of competitiveness between EMU member states, the financial market 
incorporated in the price system and, in particular, in the rates of return for governmental bond, the 
expectation of a return for the periphery countries to the respective national currencies with a 
corresponding devaluation. The fear that the euro and EMU could be just one step away from the 
collapse was real, since the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, on July 26th 2012 considered worth to 
declare: 
 
"When people talk about the fragility of the euro and the increasing fragility of the euro, and perhaps the crisis of 
the euro, very often non-euro area member states or leaders, underestimate the amount of political capital that is 
being invested in the euro. And so we view this, and I do not think we are unbiased observers, we think the euro is 
irreversible".13 
 
As to confirm this position a couple of weeks later, in the editorial of the Monthly Bulletin it has been 
stressed: 
  
"Exceptionally high risk premia are observed in government bond prices in several countries and financial 
fragmentation hinders the effective working of monetary policy. Risk premia that are related to fears of the 
reversibility of the euro are unacceptable, and they need to be addressed in a fundamental manner. The euro is 
irreversible." (ECB, 2012b, pp.5). 
 
The crisis arose, at first, in the sovereign bond market and, subsequently, in the interbank market. At 
the beginning, the investors started short-selling their periphery government bonds, thus, causing for 
these latter an increase in the rate of return and a decrease in the price. Thereafter, periphery credit 
institutions were precluded from accessing the interbank market, i.e., the loans previously granted by 
other financial institutions were rejected in order to avoid the risks of potential losses arising from their 
exposure to the sovereign securities. Given their impossibility to obtain credit on the interbank market 
then, TARGET2 imbalances can be considered as reflecting, on the one hand, the capital outflow due to 
the short-selling of peripheral government bonds and, on the other hand, the necessity for the credit 
institution to finance through non-standard monetary policy measures.  
As far as the economic policy suggestions are concerned, the periphery interpretation strongly defends 
the ECB monetary policy choices, i.e. the non-standard measures that, further to offsetting the outflow of 
monetary base observed in the peripheral countries, avoided a dramatic crisis of liquidity for the banking 
systems of these countries.14 
                                                             
12 See Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012a; 2012b; 2011). 
13 Global Investment Conference held in London: 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
14 See ECB (2013; 2012c; 2011a), Cecchetti et al. (2012), Cecioni and Ferrero (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2012) and 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2011). 
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3.1 The empirical evidence 
  
As for the empirical perspective, the literature did not express a unique position on the determinants 
of TARGET2 imbalances. Cecioni and Ferrero (2012), with their statistical analysis, showed a correlation 
between TARGET2 imbalances and BoP financial account imbalances whereas current account deficits 
did not provide any explanation for the growing in TARGET2 imbalances. In the periphery countries the 
financial account imbalances stemmed by the reallocation of financial assets, as carried out not only by 
financial institutions, towards the core countries. During the period preceding the sovereign debt crisis, a 
certain correlation between TARGET2 and current account emerged for Greece only.15 The econometric 
analysis of De Grauwe and Ji (2012) highlighted the negative and significant impact of the peripheral 
government bond yields on deficits observed in TARGET2 balances, with the first variable taken as an 
indicator of the crisis of confidence in the capacity of European institutions to survive. The authors also 
showed the cumulated value of the BoP current account deficit not to be correlated with TARGET2 
imbalances. However, it is worth stressing that the findings of the econometric analysis should not be 
interpreted as a causal link in which the rates of return are the determinant and the TARGET2 
imbalances the effect. Indeed, it is reasonable to define the increase in the government bond yields also as 
given by the capital outflow that is, in turn, at the base of the TARGET2 imbalances. 
For Auer (2013), which also makes use of the econometric analysis, the evolution of TARGET2 
imbalances and of the BoP current account imbalances are not correlated until August 2007; successively, 
a strong correlation emerged between the two variables. The author stressed that this result should be 
interpreted with caution as it simply implies that, with the onset of the financial crisis, the current account 
deficits were increasingly being funded rather using the resources obtainable through the non-standard 
monetary policy measures than through private capital inflows. Regarding the reasons behind this, no 
evidence is provided other than either a re-evaluation of the risk connected to disparities in the level of 
competitiveness among countries or a confidence crisis in the capacity of the EMU to survive. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis does not appear decisive in settling the question of what are the determinants of 
differentials in TARGET2 balances. 
   
 As argued in Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012a), the persistent deficits in BoP current account 
accumulated before the crisis have favoured the growing of financial liabilities towards foreign creditors; 
therefore, the possible correlation between TARGET2 balances and financial account balance observed 
during the sovereign debt crisis could simply reflect the decision of the foreign creditors to short sell the 
financial assets hold in the periphery countries due to an increase in the country risk following the 
worsening of the micro and macro-economic context in their economies. At the same time, those 
financial resources provided through the non-standard monetary policy measures made the possibility for 
the periphery countries to honour the debts incurred in previous years.16 
This hypothesis about the correlation between TARGET2 balances and financial account balance 
appeared less reasonable to a closer examination on how the BoP current account evolved over time 
when considering periphery country individually. Although at the aggregate level there was a good match 
between the cumulative deficit in the current account and the one in TARGET2. Such correspondence 
seemed less obvious for some countries when the current account was analysed in its breakdown 
components: net exports, net transfers and net primary income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15 See also Bindseil and König (2011), Whelan (2012). 
16 See also Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012). 
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Figure 3 – Current account balances and TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem,  
 selected EMU Member States (1999 – 2012) 
(euro billion, cumulative values) 
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Source: elaboration on the "AMECO" dataset, last data revision on the 19th October 2013; 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm. 
 
Figure 4 – Breakdown of the Current account balances, 
 selected EMU Member States (1999 – 2012) 
(euro billion, cumulative values) 
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Source: elaboration on the "AMECO" dataset, last data revision on the 19th October 2013; 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm. 
 
The cumulative deficits in the BoP current account and the maximum cumulative deficits in TARGET2 
match well enough for Greece, Portugal and Spain with the first are higher than the second (see Figure 3). 
The situation was different for both Ireland and Italy where the maximum capital outflow observed in the 
TARGET2 system was higher than the inflow that would have accompanied the accumulation of the 
deficit in the current account:: the value of the first are, respectively, 145.2 and 289.3 billion euro 
compared with 24.7 and 249.1. In Italy this evidence would have been even more apparent if it had 
considered the period before the debt crisis, 1999-2009, to calculate the cumulative deficit of the current 
account (137.1 billion euro). A close look to the breakdown of the BoP current account suggest that the 
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cumulative deficit should be mainly ascribed rather to the dynamics of the net primary income in Ireland 
and of the net current transfers in Italy than to net exports of goods and services (see Figure 4). In 
Ireland, the cumulative surplus in net exports amounted to 311.6 billion euro, while the deficit in the 
primary income was 314.6. In Italy, compared to a cumulative surplus in net exports of 7.0 billion euro, 
the cumulative deficit in current transfers stood at 162.2 billion. In both countries, the level of 
competitiveness was not enough to offset the cumulative deficits in the current transfers and in the 
primary income, but it would be difficult to argue that, between the creation of the EMU and the 
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, the financial markets have supported an excessive consumption of 
goods and services when compared with the potential of their economic systems. 
 
 
4. Political decisions and the TARGET2 balances dynamic. 
 
Within the periphery interpretation, TARGET2 imbalances reflect a decisive fall in the level of 
confidence towards the capacity of the European Monetary Union to face the sovereign debt crisis. In 
line with this position, it can be argued that the dynamic of TARGET2 imbalances is closely related to the 
pattern followed by the European institutions in taking some key political decisions. Indeed, TARGET2 
imbalances revealed the tendency of gathering before and after those choices that proved to be decisive in 
influencing the perception about the level of cohesion shown by the European institutions in facing the 
crisis.  
 
Figure 5 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Greece (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
 
 
In Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the TARGET2 liabilities have accumulated in a short period of time. 
In the first two countries, most of the accumulation occurred in the months preceding both the request 
for financial support to the European institutions and the beginning of the economic and financial 
adjustment programme, respectively in May and December 2010. In Greece, where the maximum level of 
cumulated liabilities, 109.3 billion euro, was registered in November 2011, the 38.1 per cent was 
accumulated between November 2009 and April 2010 (see Figure 5).   In Ireland the cumulated value of 
the TARGET2 liabilities reached its peak at 145.2 billion euro in December 2010 and the 56.7 per cent of 
this amount was accumulated from August 2010 to November of the same year (see Figure 6). As far as 
11 
 
Portugal is concerned, the 47.1 per cent of the maximum liabilities of 74.5 billion euro (in March 2012) 
was accumulated between April and July 2010, one year before the request for financial support (see 
Figure 7). 
 
Figure 6 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Ireland (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
 
Figure 7 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Portugal (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
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Figure 8 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Spain (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
 
Figure 9 – TARGET2 balances towards the Eurosystem, Italy (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, monthly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "Institute of Empirical Economic Research - Osnabrück University" dataset, last data revision on the 
08th October 2013; http://www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
 
Although the outflow of financial resources from these countries may be considered as stemming 
from the uncertainty about the sustainability of public finances, the reasons at the basis of uncertainty 
differed across countries: the size of the public sector budget deficit hidden thanks to accounting artifices 
in Greece, the dimension of the financial support the government guaranteed to the banking sector in 
Ireland and the extension of the public sector overloaded by inefficient companies in Portugal. 
Nevertheless, it may also be argued that financial markets were mostly plagued by the question about the 
ability of the European institutions of being sufficiently cohesive in planning and deciding for an effective 
13 
 
stabilizing economic policy. Note that the decision to put into action the economic and financial 
adjustment programme in favour of the Greek government was made public only after the state election 
in the German region of North Rhine-Westphalia, given the reluctance of the German electorate to 
provide support in favour of the periphery countries. 
 
A close exam on how TARGET2 balances evolved in Italy and Spain further supports the view that 
financial markets were mostly plagued by the question about the ability of the European institutions of 
being sufficiently cohesive in planning and deciding for an effective stabilizing economic policy. In both 
the countries the surge in the cumulated liabilities started in July 201117, lasting until August 2012, when 
TARGET2 liabilities reached their maximum with values of € 289.3 billion and € 434.4 billion. Such 
values were substantially higher compared to those in other countries (see Figure 8 and 9). In Italy, the 
surge was more intense during the first seven months, whereas in Spain it was in the last seven months. 
During these periods, the 61.5 per cent and the 57.7 per cent of the maximum value reached by the 
liabilities was accumulated respectively; furthermore, in February 2012, a peak was registered in both 
countries with a negative monthly change of 76.3 and 64.6 billion euro respectively. Starting from August 
2012, the cumulative TARGET2 liabilities decrease in both countries: in Italy the contraction was of 78.2 
billion euro, with a cumulative value equal to 211.1 in September 2013; in Spain it was of 153.0 billion 
euro, with a cumulative value of 281.4 in September 2013. 
 
The analysis just presented allows us to identify three key moments within the evolution of 
TARGET2 imbalances: July 2011, February-March 2012 and July-September 2012. Each of them, at the 
same time, represents a block in the political and economic architecture that the European institutions 
have been designing in order to face the sovereign debt crisis. Given that, it seems that the determinants 
of the escalation of the crisis as well as of the widening in TARGET2 imbalances between the core and 
the peripheral countries should be ascribed rather to the political context than to the micro and macro-
economic one.  
 
The 21st of July 2011, the heads of State and Government of the Euro area and of the EU institutions 
expressed their support in the voluntary involvement of the private sector, and in particular of the credit 
institutions, in the second financial and economic adjustment program for Greece. The contribution by 
the private sector was estimated in a total amount of 106.0 billion euro for the period 2011-2019.18 In 
February 2012 the voluntary involvement of the private sector took the form of an official agreement 
under the name of "Private Sector Involvement (PSI)". Private investors accepted, this way, to write 
down the 53.5 per cent of the face value of the Greek government bonds they were holding. The above 
mentioned declaration showed the inadequacy of the first adjustment program to stabilize the Greek 
economy and, consequently, the impossibility for the Greek Government to honour its sovereign 
signature. Despite the voluntary nature of the agreement, indeed, its acceptance implied a partial Greek 
default, conclusion that can be also drawn by the fact that within the same declaration the heads of State 
and Government reiterated their commitment to honour the sovereign signature and stressed that the 
solution adopted for the case of Greece constituted an exception.  
The then-president of the ECB, Jean Claude Trichet, during the press conferences held in occasion of 
the monthly meetings of the Governing Council regarding the monetary policy, repeatedly warned about 
the possible consequences of a Greek partial default. Such an event would rather have fuelled a 
considerable volatility in the financial markets than concur to stabilize the Greek economy. 19  One year 
later, the analysis conducted by the ECB confirmed the concerns of his former president. July 2011 
represented a turning point for the sovereign debt crisis: the tensions in the bond and interbank market 
intensified resulting both in a decrease in the efficiency of the transmission mechanism of the monetary 
policy and in a reduction of the credit in favour of families and enterprises.20 
                                                             
17 Until then, in Italy there was a surplus. 
18 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/123978.pdf. 
19 See the press conferences of July 2011 or August 2011: 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is110707.en.html. 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is110804.en.html. 
20 See ECB (2012d, pp. 59). 
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On the 30th of March 2012, the Eurogroup21 decided the overall lending capacity of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)22 and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to be of 700 billion 
euro.23 This decision can be considered as the final step in the reforming process launched by the 
European institutions to prevent and manage instability situations of states within the EMU. 
The first element of this process was indubitably represented by the treaty establishing the ESM, 
signed on 2 February 2012 by the euro area Member States. The ESM is an intergovernmental institution 
with the task of managing financial support programmes in favour of the government of the euro area 
countries; in order to finance these support programmes this institution can issue debt instruments. Thus, 
the ESM represents a permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the Eurozone Member States. The 
second element was the "Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union", signed the 2nd of March 2012 by the Heads of State and Government of all EU 
member states24. The Treaty, among other things, established that:  a) the structural budget deficit of 
public administration, adjusted for the business cycle, must not exceed 0.5 per cent of gross domestic 
product expressed at market prices with the further obligation to incorporate this budget rule into the 
national legislation, preferably at the level of constitutional law (Article 3, paragraph one and two); b)  the 
contracting parties have to reduce of one twentieth per year the rate of the general government debt-to-
GDP ratio when it exceeds the reference value of 60% (Article 4).25 The third element was an effect of 
the approval, in November 2011, by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union of 
the new regulations pertaining to the procedures and sanctions aimed at preventing and correcting the 
macroeconomic imbalances, in general, and the excessive deficit of the structural budget of public 
administration, in particular. 26  
The sustainability of fiscal policy has been the guiding principle of the whole reforming process.  
However, just when the European institutions have accomplished this process, tensions in the financial 
markets shown a strong deterioration as it is suggested by the evolution of TARGET2 balances.27  From 
our point of view, the reason for the renewed pressure lies in the fact that the markets evaluated the 
resources allocated through the EFSF and the ESM as insufficient. Indeed, of the 700 billion euro 
allocated, about 188.4 were already committed to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Moreover, in March 2012 
the public debt of Italy and Spain amounted to over 2560 billion euro making quite problematic any 
action in supporting both countries in case of a request for accessing a program of financial support.  
                                                             
21 The Eurogroup is an informal body which members are the Ministers of Economy of the countries belonging to 
the EMU and a chairman; its meetings are attended also by the European Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs and the Euro, and by the President of ECB. The main task of Eurogroup is to coordinate the 
economic policies implemented by countries in the euro zone. 
22 The EFSF is a "société anonyme" under the Luxembourgish law, a special vehicle, with the task of raising funds 
through the issuance of bonds backed by the States belonging to the EMU. The funds are, then, used to implement 
support programmes. 
23 See http://eurozone.europa.eu/media/368010/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12. 
24 With the exception of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. 
25 "By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, as Member States of the European Union, to strengthen the economic pillar of the 
economic and monetary union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to s trengthen the 
coordination of their economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European 
Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion" (Article 1). 
26 The new framework is based on five regulations and one directive, hence the name of "The Six Pack". The 
Regulations n. 1175/2011, n. 1177/2011 and n. 1173/2011 defined, respectively, the procedures to prevent and 
correct the occurrence of an excessive deficit in the structural balance of public administration, as well as the 
penalties for not complying with the same procedures. The Regulations n. 1176 and n. 1174 defined the procedures 
and sanctions related to the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances that can lead to instability in 
the European Union economies. Finally, the Directive no. 2011/85/EU  defined the requirements and penalties 
relating to the proper preparation of the public administration budget and the independence of national statistical 
institutes. 
27 The statistical analysis conducted in Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012b) confirms this occurrence. The authors, 
however, attribute it mainly to the second extraordinary refinancing operation carried out by the ECB. It can be 
stressed, though, that during this month the macroeconomic framework of the two countries does not change and, 
thus, it is difficult to motivate the outflow of capital solely on the basis of a difference between the levels of 
competitiveness. 
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Within the picture just described, the decision to set the total lending capacity of the EFSF and the 
ESM to 700 billion euro did not represented a credible reassurance measure against those who assumed 
the EMU inability to survive. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in signing the Treaty which 
established the ESM, Euro Area States reiterated that the assessment of the lending capacity adapted to 
the needs would have been carried out by March 2012.28 The circumstance that this assessment was 
carried out only on the 30th of March suggests, at least, a certain reluctance of the various states to 
commit resources to the financial aid programs. 
 
The 2nd of August 2012, during the press conference following the meeting of the Governing Council 
dedicated to monetary policy decisions, Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB, outlined the underlying 
principles of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), a new sovereign bond-buying program designed 
to replace the Securities Market Program (SMP)29 into force since the 10th May 2010.30  Only few days 
before, President Draghi claimed: 
 
"Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be 
enough."31   
 
The 6th September 2012 the technical aspect of the programs were further explained during the press 
conference and the relative press release32. The programme has been designed in order to eliminate those 
price distortions in the sovereign bond market due to the non-acceptable hypothesis of a return to the 
national currencies. This aim has been pursued by setting up an unlimited buying capacity of one to three 
year bonds to be held upon maturity. The countries eligible for the OMTs, i.e. the ones that can issue the 
bonds, should have, in first place, participated to a macroeconomic adjustment programme (through the 
EFSF and/or the ESM) or to a precautionary programme and, secondly, should have fully fulfilled the 
conditions established by these latter programmes. Furthermore, the ECB has full discretion about the 
activation, the continuation or the discontinuation of the programme for a specific country and, 
consistently with pursuing the objective of price stability, sterilizes any liquidity injected through the 
OMTs.  
Compared to the SMP, the OMT made,  on the one hand,  more stringent the conditionality principle 
and, indeed, only those countries that were able to effectively implement the interventions required by the 
financial support programme would have benefited of the ECB support on the secondary market; on the 
other hand, it created the preconditions for a more decisive and efficient ECB intervention as only a 
recovery in the price distortions should have represented a sufficient reason to stop purchasing bond on 
the secondary mark.  
 
 
5. ECB's as a lender of last resort 
 
The European System of Central Banks (ESBC), that includes the ECB and the national central banks of 
European Union Member States, has as principal aim that of guaranteeing the price stability. In this view it defines 
and implements the monetary policy. The ESBC is directed by the ECB's decision-making bodies i.e. the Governing 
Council and the Executive Board. The ECB function is to assure that the tasks assigned to the ESBC are carried out 
                                                             
28 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127633.pdf. 
29 The SMP was the first sovereign bonds buying programme on the secondary market launched by the ECB on 10 
May 2010. 
30 see http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html. 
31 Speech at the Global Investment Conference held in London on 26 July 2012:  
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
32 For the press conference held at the end of the Governing Council meeting devoted to monetary policy decisions, 
see http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html; while for the press release see 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html. 
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either by its own activities or by those of the national central banks.33 Referring to these latter, the article 12, first 
paragraph, of the Statue of the ESCB and of the ECB states: 
 
"[…] The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid down by the 
Governing Council. In doing so the Executive Board shall give the necessary instructions to national central banks. […] To 
the extent deemed possible and appropriate […] the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry out 
operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB". 
 
Therefore, the ECB, as decision-making body of the ESBC, decides and implement the monetary policy with the 
operational support of the national central banks of the states belonging to the EMU. These latter, together with the 
ECB constitutes the Eurosystem34. 
 
Despite the clarity of the legislative provisions on how the responsibilities for taking and implementing the 
monetary policy decisions are allocated, some claims seems to be ambiguous and misleading: 
 
"The base money flowing out of the GIIPS via international transactions was thus completely offset by the creation of new base 
money by the GIIPS NCBs. The monetary base in the GIIPS, […] consists of one component that arose from asset 
purchases, and another that resulted from net refinancing operations of the central banks with the commercial banks. However, 
in other euro core countries, particularly Germany […] there is in addition outside money that flowed in via the Target 
accounts. The central banks of these countries had to create this central bank money on behalf of the central banks of the 
GIIPS in order to fulfil their transfer orders." (Sinn and Wollmershäuser, 2012b, pp. 478). 
 
From these statements it appears that national central banks of the periphery decide autonomously both about 
creating the monetary base and transferring it toward core countries in order to satisfy the necessities of their 
financial institutions.35 On the contrary, national central banks actions consist, essentially in legal obligations 
stemming from the non-standard measures of monetary policy decided and implemented by the ECB in its role of 
decision-making body of the ESBC. National central banks, both of periphery and core countries, have to run the 
monetary base transfer according to the requests made by the financial institutions, as long as the financial 
institutions have the necessary resources at their national central bank that means, in the context of the sovereign 
debt crisis, as long as the financial institutions can access the refinancing operations implemented by the 
Eurosystem. This is true even in the presence of the operations of "Emergency Liquidity Assistance" (ELA), which, 
while not having to be explicitly authorized by the Executive Board of the ECB, can be removed if some specific 
conditions arise (see Buiter et al. 2011). 
 
Given the impossibility for the national central banks to take autonomous decisions, the main discussion regards 
the choices the ECB took, towards the financial institutions of the Eurozone, via the non-standard monetary policy 
measures. According to the "core" interpretation, in order to support peripheral countries, the ECB is keeping the 
rate of interest for the refinancing operations artificially low. This kind of policy crowded out the private financial 
sector that would have been available for lending financial resources at a higher interest rate. In turn, a higher 
interest rate should have forced a reduction in the production level and a following price adjustment. In particular 
the wage rate would have decreased, giving to the peripheral countries the opportunity to gain competitiveness on 
international markets. These conclusions are based on the crucial hypothesis that the price system accurately reflects 
the macroeconomic and microeconomic fundamentals of each country.  
It is more plausible to assume, though, that the ECB's strategy did not endorsed these conclusions and, on the 
contrary, reflected the conviction that the system of price is not adequately performing its role, as it is incorporating 
the politically unacceptable expectation of an EMU break up or, at least, of the return to the national currency of 
some member of the Eurozone. The reading of the dynamics observed in TARGET2 balances, as described in the 
previous section, provides a clear support for this interpretation of the ECB's behaviour. The distortion recorded in 
the price system and its inability to depict the actual situation of the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
fundamentals, required, in the first place, the ECB to broadly interpret its role of “lender of last resort” in favour of 
credit institutions and, secondly, to threaten, so far so credible, to implicitly assume the same role for the benefit of 
the Member States of the EMU. The dynamics of some selected items of the Consolidated financial statement of the 
Eurosystem shows that the ECB’s decisions were effective; starting from July 2012, but mostly starting from January 
                                                             
33 See the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 127, first paragraph, Art. 129, first paragraph and 
Art. 282, paragraphs one and two) and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank (Art. 1, Art. 2, Art. 3, first paragraph, and Art. 9, second paragraph). 
34 See the guidelines for the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area (ECB, 2011b; pp. 9). 
35 Actually, the already mentioned authors are perfectly aware of the regulatory environment in which the monetary 
policy is decided and implemented, see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012b, p. 487). 
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2013, loans for Eurozone credit institutions provided both by the Eurosystem, mainly through longer-term 
refinancing operations, and by national central banks, through ELA operations, steadily declined (see Figure 10, 
where the longer-term refinancing operations are reported in the item “Lending to euro area credit institutions …”, 
while the ELA operations are reported in the item “Other claims on euro area credit institutions …”). 
 
Figure 10 – Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem,  
selected assets items (Jan 2008 – Jul 2013) 
(euro billion, weekly, end of the period) 
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Source: elaboration on the "ECB" dataset, last data revision on the 11th October 2013; 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn129 
 
In the light of these considerations, ascertaining who is responsible for paying back the TARGET2 claims 
accumulated by the central banks of the core countries becomes a mere theoretical exercise, which, although 
interesting, does nothing but fuelling concerns about the ability of the European  institutions and, in particular of 
the EMU, to survive. The TARGET2 claims as accumulated by the monetary authorities of the core countries on 
the ECB are the reflection of the financial liabilities accumulated by these countries with respect to their financial 
institutions. In a symmetrical manner, the TARGET2 deficits accumulated by the monetary authorities of peripheral 
countries to the ECB are the reflection of financial assets these countries accumulated with respect to their financial 
institutions. Therefore, the deposits accumulated by the institutions of the core countries are counterbalanced by the 
loans accumulated by the institutions of the peripheral countries. As far as the latter are granted, according to the set 
of rules laid down by the decision-making bodies of the ECB and in particular within a prudent policy management 
of the credit risk, it is not reasonable to prospect scenarios based on insolvency of the ECB.  
In order to argue that the accumulated TARGET2 claims result into an increase in the credit risk borne by the 
core countries, it is necessary to prove that it is more risky having the Eurosystem as a counterpart than any financial 
institution of the peripheral countries. In other words one should prove that the lending policy of the Eurosystem is 
more risky than that implemented by the institutions of the peripheral countries.36 From our point of view the "core 
interpretation" takes implicitly this position without demonstrating it. 37 
 
                                                             
36 This point has been clearly underlined by the ECB (2011a, pp. 40) since the beginning of the debate on 
TARGET2 balances. 
37 In addition, assuming the insolvency of the Eurosystem means denying the possibility for the Eurosystem to 
create monetary base. Where the financial institutions of the core countries were to ask for the liquidation of the 
assets held at the Eurosystem, this latter would merely accept that the monetary base, until then hold in its deposits, 
started to fuel the economic system. The only risk of this process, in the lack of a sterilization procedure, would be 
an increase in the price level with the corresponding reduction in the purchasing power (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). 
For a full discussion on this issue, see Buiter and Rahbari (2012). 
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Not only the ECB's intervention was necessary because, as already stressed, the price system was 
unable to reflect the macroeconomic and microeconomic situation correctly, it was necessary also because 
the effectiveness of the austerity policies and of the structural reform, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP- ratio 
of the countries mostly hit by the crisis, was overestimated.  
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) found that a tighter planned fiscal consolidation is associated with a level 
of actual GDP lower that the expected one. According to the authors, this result could stem from a 
strong underestimation of the fiscal multiplier. A vast literature supports this last conclusion. Empirically 
it has been highlighted that the value of the multiplier tends to be higher during the recessions and lower 
during the expansions38. 
The theoretical analysis has identified several factors that could be held responsible for such a 
dynamic. A first explanation can lie in having a constant nominal rate of interest: when adopting a 
restrictive fiscal policy, the lower pressure on prices, leading to a reduction in the nominal interest rate 
and stimulating the private components of the aggregate demand, could mitigate the negative impact of 
fiscal consolidation. However, when the nominal rate of interest is already close to zero such a 
mechanism cannot operate.39 Furthermore, whether the adoption of a restrictive fiscal policy were 
coupled with a reduction in the private debt burden, the intensity of the recession might be such as to 
generate a phenomenon of deflation which would frustrate the efforts for stabilizing the debt  made both 
by the public administration trough the fiscal consolidation and by the private sector40 A second 
explanation can lie in a limited validity of the Ricardian equivalence: in adopting a restrictive fiscal policy, 
the lower expected tax burden can stimulate the private demand limiting, this way, the negative impact of 
the fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, this mechanism would not operate at all if the economic agents are 
either characterized by a limited time horizon or by a rationed access to the credit market.41  
 
The combination of the above mentioned elements suggests that austerity policies, i.e. a restrictive 
fiscal policy together with a monetary policy that does not favour the reduction in interest rates, can be 
inappropriate, at least in the short run, to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.42 Therefore, these policies 
appear to be highly unsuitable in the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone, especially 
when they are implemented in the absence of an institution acting as a “lender of last resort” for the 
benefit of the countries of the periphery, as it would be usually the case for a monetary authority with 
respect to financial institutions. The ECB took this kind of responsibility through the OMTs.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper argues that the dynamics in TARGET 2 balances rather than telling about a balance-of-
payment crisis due to competitiveness disparities across Eurozone Member States, reveals, in general, the 
shortfalls in the European institution choices when dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. In particular, 
these shortfalls stem from the implicit refusal of setting up a mechanism or giving life to an institution 
that would have served as a “lender of last resort”.  
 
To support this thesis the following arguments have been raised: a) not all the peripheral countries 
accumulated a relevant deficit in the balance-of-payments current account; b) a substantial outflow of 
monetary base by the peripheral countries was observed in coincidence with specific policy decisions 
taken by the European institutions involving the sharp deterioration of expectations about both the 
degree of solvency of countries belonging to the Euro area and the distribution of risks of a possible 
default either partial or total; c) the monetary policy decided and implemented by the ECB stems from its 
legitimate and unavoidable role of lender of last resort for credit institutions to avoid their liquidity crisis; 
                                                             
38 See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). 
39 See Christiano et al. (2011) and  Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). 
40 See Eggertsson and  Krugman (2012). 
41  Arestis (2012). 
42 This conclusion is also confirmed by the European Commission (2012); see also Boussard et al. (2012).  
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d) fiscal consolidation and the consequent real depreciation tend to destabilize the economic system in 
the presence of a strongly negative conjuncture and a monetary policy ineffective in reducing the interest 
rates.  
These elements draw a picture that suggests the unavoidability of creating either an institution or a 
mechanism which could have played the role of “lender of last resort” for supporting the peripheral 
countries. Indeed, only when the ECB has taken such a responsibility with the launch of the OMTs, clear 
signs of improvement were observed in the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis. The dynamics of the 
TARGET2 system imbalances was determined by obvious tensions in financial markets due to a crisis of 
confidence in the ability of EMU to survive. This crisis of confidence, however, was not the result of a 
historical accident, but was the direct consequence of the implicit rejection of the European institutions 
to give life to a mechanism that would serve as a “lender of last resort” for member states in the EMU. 
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